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THE EFFECTIVEESS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT (VAWA) IN CREATING SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGE
TARA ADAY
Grand Valley State University
Abstract
With the understanding that gendered violence is an issue that
does not exist in silos, this article seeks to analyze the effectiveness of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in creating a system-wide response to
stalking, domestic abuse, and sexual violence. Although these crimes are a
prevailing social issue, until the passage of VAWA in 1994, little concerted
effort existed between sectors or across agencies to respond to and meet the
needs of those affected by these types of violence. In addition to providing
an analysis of the partnership and funding between the public and nonprofit
sectors, this article also examines changes in legislation and rates of
victimization as indicators of system-level change. This article concludes
that although VAWA has achieved great success in the immediacy, there are
potential barriers related to the sustainability of the legislation’s desired
long-term change.
INTRODUCTION
Intimate partner violence, often referred to as domestic violence or
domestic abuse, is a national issue, affecting 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men
(Breiding, Smith, Basile, Walters, Chen, & Merrick, 2011). Nearly 1 in 5
women and 1 in 59 men in the United States have been raped in their
lifetime (Breiding et al., 2011). One in 6 women have been stalked during
their lifetime, comparable to 1 in 19 men (Breiding et al., 2011). While
research is limited, in part due to the lack of statistically significant data,
studies suggest rates are even higher among marginalized communities,
including women of color, the LGBTQ community, individuals with
disabilities, and Native communities (Walters, Chen, & Breiding, 2013).
Yet, until 1994, there was little concerted effort to respond and combat
these realities (Biden, 19994). Moreover, lack of consistency in state and
federal law regarding domestic and sexual violence made it hard for law
enforcement to prosecute and prevent repeat offenders from committing
future crimes. For example, when the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) passed in 1994, almost one quarter of convicted rapists were
never sent to prison, and nearly one-third of all American women homicide
victims were murdered by a current or former intimate partner (Biden,
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1994). Organizations attempting to respond to gender-based violence
(GBV) through crisis centers, nurse examiner programs, counseling,
technical assistance, and preventative educational outreach—among other
services—received minimal federal dollars; little collaboration existed
between the public, nonprofit, and private sector (Biden, 1994).
In 1994, Congress passed VAWA in an attempt to create
community-coordinated responses to the way in which crimes against
women and men were investigated and prosecuted, as well as how they
were prevented. The 1994 legislation signified the first time federal
legislation acknowledged domestic and sexual violence as crimes. VAWA
allows for formula-based and discretionary grant funding to state, local, and
tribal governments, nonprofits, and private organizations addressing issues
related to gender- based violence—intimate partner violence, sexual assault,
and stalking. While additional private support still accounts for funding of
GBV initiatives, VAWA remains a primary funding stream for agencies
intervening and responding to issues of GBV (Sacco, 2013). Since 1994, the
legislation has been reauthorized three additional times in 2000, 2005, and
2013. During each of these reauthorizations, additional measures were
added to more holistically address GBV crimes.
The long-term goal of VAWA is to “effect institutionalized system
change, such that victims encounter a positive and effective response from
the criminal and civil justice systems, and from community agencies
offering services and supports” (Zweig & Burt, 2002). This paper sets out to
examine the effectiveness of the Violence Against Women Act in its ability
to serve victims/survivors of GBV, but more importantly, its ability to
prevent future acts of violence, which in effect would be a representation of
institutionalized system change. This includes a meta-analysis of the
collaborative efforts between the public and nonprofit sector on issues
related to GBV, and whether current approaches to GBV response and
prevention are efficient and effective. On a broader level, this paper will
look at the ability of public policy to create system-level change.
Historical Background of Advocacy Efforts and Their Effects on
Government Policy
Before Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act, social
movements, such as Second Wave and Third Wave Feminism emerged,
developing theory and urging government to change how they addressed
problems once perceived solely as private issues. Weldon (2002) suggests
Second Wave Feminism became a driving force behind the increased
discussion of the political public sphere versus the private sphere, as it
related to gender justice and equality. As a result, she argues the
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mobilization of the Battered Women’s Movement—a reflection of second
and third wave feminism—served as a key catalyst to policy change in the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s. By bringing private issues into the
public, the Battered Women’s Movement challenged many of the social
norms and attitudes that affected women, and as a result demanded greater
representation and protection of traditionally and historically marginalized
populations.
Weldon (2011) suggests much of the ideology behind the Battered
Women’s Movement, and its ability to permeate the public sector, brought
attention to the need for systemic change within the larger community. As a
social movement, these stakeholders advocated for increased
institutionalization of the response and intervention of violence against
women. While not the only driving force behind VAWA, the Battered
Women’s Movement played a critical role in the creation of this legislation.
It also reflects a push for greater accountability on behalf of the government
and increased partnership between sectors, an effort that will be addressed
later in this paper.
An additional point to be made about the response and advocacy
efforts around violence against women prior to the authorization of VAWA
is the relative organizational independence from the government these
social movements maintained. In many ways, this created issues regarding
the prosecution of these crimes and revealed a needed collaboration
between law enforcement and the nonprofit sector, but as Weldon (2002)
suggests, it is not to say that these social movements were ineffective in
creating system-level change prior to the enactment of VAWA. Instead,
VAWA’s enactment represented a shift in government responsiveness,
recognizing violence against women as a category of national government
action (Weldon, 2002).
This shift can best be illustrated by the change from status quo and
policy stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s to legislative action in the 1980s
and 1990s. In 1984, the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence
released a report, asserting violence between intimate partners is no longer a
“family matters” issue, and therefore could no longer be an issue addressed
solely within the household (Department of Justice, 1984, p. iii). The task
force made nearly 50 recommendations across the public and nonprofit
sectors, advocating for greater cooperation between the criminal justice
system and providers of social services (Department of Justice, 1984).
Shortly following the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family
Violence’s report, Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention and
Services Act (FVPSA). Narrow in scope, the legislation addressed
components of the task force’s recommendations, but failed to
comprehensively address domestic violence. In response to these gaps of
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service and reluctance between sectors to increase partnership, Congress
passed VAWA in 1994. Originally passed as Title IV of the Violence Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, VAWA became the first and
only piece of legislation to take a comprehensive approach, primarily
through funding, to serving victims/survivors and preventing further
instances of GBV crimes.
Overview of the Violence Against Women Act
VAWA, which has been reauthorized by Congress three times
since its inception, is still premised on two goals:
1. Enhance investigations and prosecutions of offenders
2. Provide for a number of grant programs to address the
issue of violence against women from a variety of angles
including law enforcement, public and private entities and
service providers, and victims of crime (Congressional
Research Service, 2012, p.2).
While the desired short-term and long-term outcomes within these larger
goals have evolved and changed over the years, the focus remains the same.
Investigation and Prosecution. In large part, early success of
VAWA came in the form of policy reform and implementation. In addition
to recognizing domestic violence, stalking, and sexual violence as a federal
crime, the enacted law began to provide a basis for the investigation and
prosecution of these crimes. As a result of the legislation, new offenses and
penalties were established for the violation of a protection order as well as
issues related to the prosecution of offenders crossing state lines or entering
into territories or tribal communities (Congressional Research Service,
2012). VAWA also established pretrial detention mandates for crimes of
sexual offense and increased penalties for an array of sex offenses, among
other things.
During the 2000 reauthorization of VAWA, Congress enhanced
penalties for domestic violence and stalking and added protections for
abused foreign nationals (Sacco, 2013). Again during the 2005
reauthorization, Congress increased penalties for crimes against women,
namely repeat offenders (Sacco, 2013).
Grant Programs. In addition to changing laws on the state and
federal level, the major output of VAWA was the creation of a funding
stream for agencies in all sectors responding to GBV crimes or providing
services to the victims/survivors of these crimes. Since FY2012, VAWA
has authorized and/or enacted funding to 33 discretionary and formula grant
programs, which are administered primarily by the Office on Violence
Against Women (OVW), but are also administered by the Office of Justice
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Programs, Department of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Health and Human Services. These grants cover three areas of
focus: violence prevention, investigations and prosecutions, and victim
services (Sacco, 2013).
Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors Grant Program.
There are many different funding components of VAWA, but one of the
primary ways the federal government provides funding across the sectors is
through Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors (STOP) grants. Of
current grant programs, the STOP Grant Program is the highest spending
program, and funding for this program continued to grow through fiscal
year 2010. Between the fiscal years 2007-2012, the federal government
authorized $1.4 billion solely for STOP grant funding, compared to $800
million dollars between fiscal years 1995-2000 (Aron & Newmark, 1999;
Congressional Research Service, 2010).
The purpose of this formula grant program is to support state and
territorial governments, localities(including law enforcement), and human
service providers by developing and strengthening law enforcement and
prosecution strategies to “combat violence crimes against women, and to
develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violence crimes
against women” (Aron & Newmark, 1999). As a condition of STOP
funding, agencies must use the funding in one of seven areas: training for
law enforcement or prosecution; special law enforcement or prosecution
units; policy development for law enforcement or prosecution; development
of data and communication systems; direct victim services; programs
addressing stalking; or grants to Native American tribes (Aron & Newmark,
1999). A majority of this article will focus on the STOP grants, given the
size of its budget and its relatively large focus as it relates to program inputs
(cross-sector partnership) and program outcomes.
Funding. The reauthorization of VAWA in 2000 and 2005 brought
a general increase in funding authorization and appropriation for grant
programs (CRS, 2010). However, since FY2011, there has been a
significant decrease in overall funding across programs. Even with the 2013
VAWA reauthorization, funding is still significantly below that of the
second reauthorization. Table 1 provides an overview of total appropriated
funds for VAWA since 1994 (CRS, 2008; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2015). Table 2
provides an overview of the five highest funded grant programs under
VAWA between FY2012-FY2015 (CRS, 2008; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2015).
While the STOP Grant Program receives the most funding, this grant also
provides funding, through set-aside funding, for other VAWA authorized
programs such as the Tribal Government Program, The State Coalitions
Program, and the Tribal Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Coalitions
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Program. However, the STOP Grant Program is still the highest funded
program even when these funds are removed from its annual budget.
Table 1: Enacted VAWA Funding by Fiscal Year
TOTAL ENACTED FUNDS
FISCAL YEAR
ACROSS
ALL
GRANT
PROGRAMS (in millions)
1995
$27.00
1996
$227.10
1997
$258.50
1998
$420.75
1999
$438.75
2000
$453.25
2001
$407.11
2002
$517.22
2003
$519.98
2004
$517.11
2005
$517.18
2006
$559.22
2007
$558.92
2008
$525.47
2009
$595.31
2010
$625.91
2011
$475.76
2012
$456.39
2013
$432.63
2014
$461.00
2015
$474.53
It is important to examine this funding because it provides an
overview of funding priorities, which have remained relatively consistent,
in terms of distribution across programs, since 1995 (CRS, 2008; CRS,
2010; CRS, 2015). Table 2 also provides a snapshot of how funding is
distributed across service delivery (i.e. Rural grant) versus primary
prevention (i.e. Rape Prevention and Education Grant). It is also important
to note that most programs fund different sectors at comparable rates (CRS,
2015). In other words, government agencies receive comparable funding to
the amount of funding nonprofits receive across programs that are available
to both sectors (CRS, 2015; CRS, 2010).
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Office on Violence Against Women
Finally, VAWA also allowed for the creation of the Office on
Violence Against Women (OVW), a branch of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The primary role of this department is to administer funding to
grantees, but it is also responsible for the facilitation of technical assistance
across sectors.
Currently, OVW administers 24 grant programs authorized by VAWA.
Since OVW’s inception, it has awarded over $6 billion in grants (CRS,
2015; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2008). In many ways, OVW represents a multifaceted approach to violence prevention and intervention that motivated the
original authorization of VAWA. Through its funding, OVW is able to
convene and forge partnerships between state, local, and tribal partnerships
among law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and direct-service providers.
A further analysis of the development of OVW can be found in the
discussion of the effectiveness of government contracting.
Impacts and Shortcomings of VAWA
For the most part, successes of VAWA are measured using a
quantifiable approach. As federal agencies such as the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
assess rates of victimization, Congress and the White House are able to
utilize these reports in Congressional hearings surrounding the
reauthorization of the legislation (CRS, 2015). While grantees are
responsible for reporting data, this data is often output based. For example,
reporting data is usually limited to short-term data and process evaluation,
such as number of individuals served or types of services provided, but does
not include longitudinal evaluation or an assessment of the outcomes. This
creates barriers in comprehensively measuring the successes and impact of
the act, and currently, there is no national evaluation of VAWA (Zweig &
Burt, 2002).
Lastly, when assessing the impacts of VAWA, it is important to
note that much of the literature is limited to the social impact of VAWA and
ignores potential achievements or shortcomings within the realm of public
administration. Moreover, data that is often cited by Congress and the
White House when discussing successes of VAWA lacks consistency. For
example, in 2012 the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reported that from
1994 to 2010, the overall rate of intimate partner violence in the United
States declined by 64 percent, from 9.8 victimizations per 1,000 persons in
1994 to 3.6 per 1,000 in 2010.
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Table 2: Highest Funded VAWA Grant Programs (FY2011-FY2015)

Grant Program

Purpose/Goal

FY2012FY2015
Enacted
Funding
(in millions)

Grant
Administer

Organizations
Eligible to Apply

$962.63

Services, Training,
Officers, and
Prosecutors
(STOP) Grant
Program

Enhance advocacy and
improve criminal
justice system’s
response to violence
crimes against women

Office on Violence
Against Women
(DOJ)

States and territories
(including tribal
governments, units of
local governments, and
nonprofit,
nongovernmental
victim service
programs as subgrantees)

Grants to
Encourage Arrest
Policies and
Enforcement of
Protection Orders
Program

Increase involvement
of entire criminal
justice system;
encourage state, local,
and tribal governments
to treat GBV as a
serious crime

Office on Violence
Against Women
(DOJ)

States and territories;
units of local
government; tribal
governments; and
state, local, tribal, and
territorial courts

$256.44

Civil Legal
Assistance for
Victims Grant
Program

Strengthen civil and
criminal legal
assistance programs
for adults and youth
victims/survivors of
GBV who are seeking
legal action in matters
arising as a
consequence of that
abuse or violence

Office on Violence
Against Women
(DOJ)

Nonprofit entities;
territorial
organizations; tribal
governments and
organizations;
publically funded
organizations not
acting in a government
capacity (i.e. law
schools)

$199.60

Rape Prevention
and Education
Grants

Strengthen sexual
violence prevention
efforts in the states and
territories; increase
awareness of GBV
through education and
hotline operations

Center for Disease
Control and
Prevention (HHS)

States and territories;
nonprofit organizations

$193.03

Rural Domestic
Violence, Dating
Violence, Sexual
Assault, Stalking,
and Child Abuse
Enforcement

Enhance services
available to children,
youth and adult
victims/survivors of
GBV in rural
communities

Office on Violence
Against Women
(DOJ)

States and territories;
Tribal governments;
local governments;
nonprofits (including
tribal). Must be
proposing to serve
rural areas or rural
communities

$177.31
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This data was captured by the National Crime Victimization Survey, which
collects information on nonfatal crimes reported and not reported to the
police from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. In 2014,
the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control—a Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention entity—reported 24.3 percent of women
and 13.8 percent of men experienced intimate partner violence at some
point in their lifetime (Walters et al.). This data was collected through the
2010 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS), a
self-reporting survey that is representative of the national landscape. In
short, these sets of data, though using the same understanding of intimate
partner violence and relatively similar time period, show an inconsistent
rate of victimization. While the National Institute of Justice recognizes the
differences in rates of victimization between these two surveys, citing the
context in which the two surveys are administered—the BJS’s survey
measures IPV within the context of general crime victimization, while
NISVS asks more behaviorally-oriented questions solely addressing GBV—
it is important to note that government-funded agencies tend to cite the
more favorable statistics when addressing impacts of VAWA (NIJ, 2010).
Despite these challenges, the literature around the impact of VAWA
does highlight some areas of goal attainment, especially as it relates to focus
areas of the legislation: improve the criminal justice response; ensure that
victims and their families have access to the services; and create positive
change (Zweig & Burt, 2002). The sections below outline these
achievements.
Increased Collaboration
One of the continued successes of the act is increased partnerships
between the sectors. As illustrated above the STOP Grant Program puts
particular emphasis on the collaboration of community agencies including
law enforcement, prosecution, the courts, health care, and social service
agencies. In addition to the broader program goals listed above, Zweig and
Burt (2004) assert a more narrowly-defined, long-term goal of the STOP
program:
Promote institutionalized system change throughout communities
that results in supportive and effective responses from the criminal
and civil justice systems, and other community agencies such as
domestic violence and sexual assault programs (p.613).
However, as Zweig and Burt (2004) illustrate, there has been little research
conducted on the long-term outcome of these partnerships and their ability
to create this system change. Despite the lack of comprehensive assessment,
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the authors suggest the institutionalization of these efforts has led to a
decrease in total victimization, and more specifically, a decrease in repeat
offenders (Zweig & Burt, 2004). They argue this is not only because law
enforcement agencies are effectively prosecuting the offender, but social
service agencies, such as domestic violence shelters, are able to remove the
victim and engage this person in continued support through psychoeducational groups. This empowers the victim to create change in her life,
and decreases the chances that she will return to the offender (Zweig &
Burt, 2004). In short, funding through STOP grants contributed to improved
and increased services for victims, and the coordinated response between
agencies also increased the quality of service (Zweig & Burt, 2004).
Similarly, the Greenbook National Evaluation Team assessed the
effectiveness of DOJ and HHS grants awarded across sectors aimed at
increasing cross-sector collaboration in an effort to improve practices,
services, and outcomes for children and families experiencing the cooccurrence of IPV and child abuse (2008). These VAWA-funded grants
were awarded to child welfare agencies, domestic violence service
providers, and the dependency courts. The Greenbook concluded that major
collaboration developed and even expanded over time, but this was not
without challenges. In particular, grantees reported difficulties in engaging
across systems due to philosophical difference among partners and
differences in organizational structures, power, and authority. While the
courts and child welfare agencies represented formal systems, domestic
violence agencies were more grassroots oriented and held less power in
larger systems. This at times proved to be a barrier to collaboration
(Greenbook, 2008).
Reduction of Victimization
As noted above, the literature generally suggests a decrease in
criminal victimization as a result of VAWA. The NIJ reports on
victimization, conducted since the initial authorization of VAWA, suggest
fatal assault, nonfatal rape and sexual assault, and nonfatal assault,
including physical and verbal/mental abuse, all consistently decreased since
1997 (Clark, Biddle, & Martin, 2002; BJS, DOJ, 2012). In addition to
statistics reported above, the Bureau of Justice also reports that between
1993 and 2007, the rate of intimate partner homicides of females decreased
35 percent, and the rate of intimate partner homicides of males decreased 46
percent (2012).
Although these federal reports suggest a decrease of victimization,
Zweig and Burt (2004) are a bit more critical of the idea that there is a
causal relationship between VAWA and overall reduction in crime. As they
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suggest, all violent crime decreased during this time period, not just forms
of GBV (Zweig & Burt, 2004).
Cost-Benefit Analysis
In addition to measuring the reduced rate of victimization, another
means of evaluating the success of VAWA is through a cost-benefit
analysis. As Clark et al. (2002) and Conyers (2007) illustrate, there are
inherent issues in conducting this type of analysis, primarily because of the
difficulty in assigning a cost to the nontangible losses of human life, and
other long-term effects of violence, including emotional pain and overall
reduced quality of life. Despite these difficulties, Clark et al. (2002) are still
able to conclude that the benefits far exceed the cost of VAWA (2002). At
the time of the author’s report, Clark et al. (2002) makes a conservative
estimate that the cost to serve one victim is $15.50, but results in $47 in
averted costs. Clark et al. (2002) conclude many of these cost savings come
from a reduction in health care service needs and lessened law enforcement
costs for continued charges against repeat offenders (Clark et al., 2002).
Specialization of Bureaucrats
As Van Slyke (2007) argues, one of the strongest arguments in the
expansion of the scope of the nonprofit sector is its ability to provide
expertise, especially as it relates to the human services. Through VAWA
funding, many nonprofit organizations are able to increase capacity and
infrastructure. However, this does not eliminate the role of the public sector,
and although this sector is highly professionalized, gaps of service often
arise because bureaucrats do not have the expertise to efficiently and
effectively deliver a given service as it relates to GBV. VAWA addressed
this issue through its emphasis on continued learning and education, namely
its funding for the continued training of the public sector. As a result, an
additional impact of VAWA is the increased specialization of bureaucrats.
As noted above, the STOP Grant Program remains one of the top
funding priorities of VAWA, with a significant portion going towards
improving the response and intervention of law enforcement, prosecutors,
and the courts (CRS, 2015). As Meyer-Emerick argues, inaccurate issue
literacy not only affects how policy is created, but it can also hinder the
implementation of these policies, and subsequently the response of
bureaucrats, namely law enforcement (2002). For example, if a police
officer does not understand the warning signs of domestic violence, victims
face an additional barrier in reporting the crime and seeking justice; a police
officer might not recognize an instance of GBV, and as a result neglect to
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identify it as such in a police report, which subsequently can make it harder
for a victim/survivor to receive a method of protection, such as a Personal
Protection Order. This in turn increases the danger to the victim/survivor.
Although Meyer-Emerick is somewhat critical of the VAWA and
its funding of the law enforcement, largely because of the inherent power
imbalance of profession and its tendency to disproportionately attract
perpetrators of violent crimes, her analysis points to positive outcomes of
increased specialization. She argues that one way to get at the core issues of
violence against women is to get at the root cause of the violence. By
challenging bureaucrats to change how they perceive violence against
women, especially in their recognition of violence against women as a
crime, the way the government responds to this crime might also change.
This analysis is supported by Burt, Zweig, Schlichter, and
Andrews (2000) evaluation of the STOP Grant Program. Relevant to the
discussion of increased specialization of bureaucrats, the authors note two
key findings: STOP funding resulted in increased training of law
enforcement and prosecution; and STOP funding resulted in over half of
victim services programs providing policy and protocol development
(2000). As government continues to privatize and cut specialization within
different agencies, VAWA puts more pressure on bureaucrats to uphold this
degree of specialization, which as Burt et al. (2000) indicate, increases the
quality of service victims/survivors receive when accessing services in the
public sector.
Public Management Challenges
One of the key issues that arises as a result of VAWA is the
potential inability of the federal government to efficiently and effectively
manage the grants and contracts that are awarded to the private and
nonprofit sector. As a blurring of the sectors continues, it also becomes
increasingly difficult to identify means for holding organizations
accountable for the fulfillment of the program’s desired outcomes.
Additionally, as privatization of social services increases, which at times
VAWA represents, the likelihood of the mismanagement of funding
increases (Van Slyke, 2002). The sections below examine some of the
barriers to system-level change that are created as a result of
mismanagement of federal grants as it relates to VAWA. As expanded on
below, many of the management challenges are rooted in capacity and the
difficulties relatively small departments face in administering large grants to
multiple program sites.
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Evaluation
Potentially one of the largest shortcomings of VAWA is the lack of
any comprehensive evaluation of the legislation. While grant programs such
as the STOP grant emphasize some degree of reporting to the OVW, most
of the current grant programs do not have any comprehensive assessment
requirements (Boba & Lilley, 2009). In other words, while grantees might
be required to report the number of clients served or law enforcement might
be required to report the number of individuals convicted of crimes related
to GBV, there is no evaluation model that requires these programs to look at
their services at all levels. Boba and Lilley (2009) suggest this is a result of
the diversity of focus and breadth of VAWA-funded programs. Somewhat
similarly, Klein, Brown, Small, Tucker, Fischer, and Walsh(2009) indicate
in the evaluation of a rural grant program that although Congress mandated
that the program include an evaluation under the auspices of NIJ, the
program itself was not equipped to accommodate a rigorous outcome or
impact evaluation.
Additionally, despite benefits of conducting continual program
evaluation, few organizations engage or invest in this practice without it
being a funding requirement. Those that do engage in evaluation often see it
as nothing more than a requirement of a grant, and therefore invest little
into the process of continual learning and application that is the foundation
of Evaluation Capacity Building (ECB). While the literature specific to the
importance of ECB within GBV organizations is limited, Mark, Gary
Henry, and Julnes (2000) provide an overview of the importance of this
practice, especially when trying to evaluate change in behavior—a key
desired outcome of VAWA. Reasons to engage in ECB include: evaluation
is a means of assessing the merit and worth of a program; evaluation is a
process for uncovering opportunity for program improvement; evaluation
can be an accountability tool to ensure compliance and maintain oversight;
and evaluation leads to knowledge development—both external and
internal.
ECB is a method of evaluation that promotes the continual process
of evaluation (Mark et al., 2000). Instead of being output-focused, like
much of the reporting requirements of VAWA, ECB would increase the
likelihood that organizations, especially those providing direct service, look
beyond the immediate needs of the clients—shelter, medical needs—and
instead look at the root causes of the issues, which would better address
system-level change.
While current Congressional Research Service reports do not indicate
plans to increase capacity around evaluation—internally or externally—the
CDC has taken steps to increase organizational learning among its grantees
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so that they can engage in evaluation (CRS, 2015; CRS, 2010, CRS 2008).
As DeGue, Simon, Basile, Lin Yee, Lang, and Spivak (2012) suggest, the
CDC continues to advocate for an increase of funding for Rape Prevention
and Education Grant Program so technical assistance can be provided
around evaluation and assessment. More importantly, this request for
additional funds and the overall lack of system-level evaluation points to the
overall shortcomings in the management of these grants. As DeGue et al.
(2012) suggest, without funding to conduct evaluation through VAWA,
organizations do not have the resources to engage in this practice. The
authors also suggest that without funding to assess the strategies of the
grantees, the organizations are less likely to engage in innovative
approaches to problem solving for fear of losing funding if the new
approach does not meet previously-set output goals (DeGue et al. 2012). As
it relates to the original research question, it appears as though a lack of
adequate ECB-related funding from the federal grant administers is
preventing organizations from moving beyond output-focused
programming.
New Street Level Bureaucrats
Van Slyke (2007) provides an overview of why governments often
look to increase partnerships with the nonprofit sector. Of these reasons,
there are a few that are especially applicable to VAWA: their expertise in
providing certain types of services; their proximity to clients and
communities in need; and their perceived mission and goal alignment with
government’s mission (Van Slyke, 2007). As a result of this partnership and
the overall devolution of government services, Van Slyke (2007) asserts a
new street level bureaucrat is created, in which the public no longer views
the government as the sole provider of social services. While this does not
immediately create a challenge, as supported by Burt et al.’s evaluation, it
does pose challenges if VAWA funding that supported these services
cannot be sustained. In noting the overall decreased funding Congress has
authorized for VAWA since FY 2011, this challenge might have an
increased likelihood of growing (Table 1).
As it relates to public administration and management of VAWA,
there are several issues with this potential redefining of the public sector
and nonprofit sector. First, Van Slyke (2007) suggests nonprofits are
significantly limited in their ability to achieve the overarching funding
requirements of the government. In the case of VAWA, the overall goals
would be to create system-level change, including the way institutions
engage in their larger system. Underlining this issue of the limitations of
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nonprofits is the fact that government agencies do not have the capacity to
evaluate the performance of these partners, which holds especially true for
OVW given the thousands of grants its relatively small staff oversees (Van
Slyke, 2007).
An additional issue created by the blurring of lines is the issue of
accountability. While nonprofits are sharing the responsibility to administer
GBV services, the government is usually the one held accountable by the
people when service is not delivered or when it is delivered ineffectively.
This issue is further exacerbated by the lack of evaluation, as discussed in
the previous section, because the government is not even able to detect the
ineffective service (Van Slyke, 2007). As Van Slyke (2007) asserts, the
increased reliance on nonprofit organizations creates issues in how
accountability is preserved and maintained, how public responsibilities are
identified, and how constituents file grievances.
Suppressed Advocacy
Another potential barrier to system-level change is the potential for
VAWA to suppress further advocacy efforts among grassroots and
nonprofit organizations because the nation’s response to GBV has become
so institutionalized (Kramer, 1981). As Salamon (2002) illustrates,
government funding accounted for 37 percent of nonprofits’ revenue in
1995, up 6 percent from 1977. While the degree of federal funding a
nonprofit organization receives varies, there are few that do not receive any
federal funding (Salamon, 2002). The percentage of federal funding
nonprofit organizations receive increases even more for organizations
providing services related to GBV (Zweig & Burt, 2002). For many
organizations, especially nonprofits with an annual budget over $1 million,
VAWA-funded grants are often one of the primary sources for program
funding (Sweig & Burt, 2002). Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004)
suggest this degree of dependence on federal funding has a significant
influence on the political activity of nonprofit organizations, especially
those that do not view advocacy as a primary component of their mission.
Additionally, those that recognize the need to create system-level reform
often refrain from challenging components of VAWA because they fear a
reduction in funding as a result of their advocacy efforts. This don’t-bitethe-hand-that-feeds-you mentality is among the most cited reasons by
human-service nonprofits for not engaging in any degree of advocacy
(Chaves et al., 2004).
As Hatch (2013) illustrates, power and funding dependency are
also closely related. If an organization has multiple sources of funding, it
has more relative power. As dependency of one funding source goes up,
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power goes down (Hatch, 2013). This holds true across all sectors, but again
is especially applicable to the nonprofit sector. Weldon (2002) suggests
grassroots organizations addressing violence against women in the early
1990s had more relative power than those today because they were not
dependent on any singular funding stream. As illustrated, VAWA has led
many organizations to weaken the diversity of their funding sources
because, for the most part, it has remained a consistent funding stream.
As mentioned in the background section, the Battered Women’s
Movement effectively improved government responsiveness to violence
against women (Weldon, 2002). This is a representation of its power. The
social movement created institutionalized change through the creation of
VAWA, institutions such as OVW, and reformed federal policy such as
stricter convictions. Yet, as Weldon (2002) suggests, political activism
significantly decreased following the passage of the VAWA because many
of the community organizers saw an achievement in their goals. For the
most part, continued reauthorizations of VAWA represent the government’s
agenda around issues of violence—an agenda that consistently gave way to
increased funding.
Ultimately, suppressed political activity or decreased advocacy
results in less system-level change (Kramer, 1981). As the federal
government continues to increase funding to a larger number of agencies
across the sectors, but fails to increase assessment components, the ability
to detect ineffective approaches or gaps in service delivery decreases. This
makes it more likely that programs will neglect to reach long-term
outcomes because long-term accountability is not created nor sustained. As
it relates to advocacy and system-wide change, VAWA seems to give way
to complacency as opposed to continued reform (Weldon, 2002).
CONCLUSION
While it still remains difficult to evaluate the overall success of
VAWA in effectively creating system-level change, there are measurable
outcomes that seem to support this idea. VAWA led to policy reform that
allowed law enforcement to prosecute individuals for crimes related to
GBV. The act also provides funding for the much-needed services of
victims/survivors in addition to allocating significant funding for increased
technical assistance across sectors. As the literature suggests, this has
helped to increase understanding of the crimes as well as service delivery
across systems.
However, there are still significant issues regarding VAWA that
are primarily rooted in the public sector management of the increasing
number and focus of its grant programs. Although VAWA created OVW,
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an approach that was intended to create better avenues for management of
the grant programs, the literature suggests there are still significant capacity
issues. In particular, long-term outcome evaluation is not consistently taking
place, which makes it hard to assess the overall success of the act.
Additionally, the public’s increased dependence on the nonprofit sector
creates a myriad of issues related to public management and sustainability.
Ultimately, VAWA is representative of many of the challenges that
arise as a result of the increased blurring of the roles and responsibilities of
the public and nonprofit sector. While this article highlights some of the
benefits of increased collaboration, it also shows how resource dependency
can lead to a decrease in power and influence. While there is a role for both
sectors in the prevention, intervention, and response of GBV, it becomes
difficult to assess the degree to which the sectors are achieving system
change without a culture of continued evaluation. Moreover, as the
government continues to increase the scope of its funding under VAWA, it
becomes more important to assess the capacity needed to efficiently manage
these funds. While it is important to address problems of GBV, it is also
important only to take on programs within the capacity of the managing
agency.
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